SafeAdapt-Poker: Counterfactual Risk Calibration for Budgeted Adaptation under Opponent Shift· SafeAdapt-Poker：预算适应下的对手偏移风险校准
Opponent histories can mislead after behavioral shifts. SafeAdapt-Poker formulates budgeted adaptation under opponent shift as a dual-counterfactual sequential-control problem using only information available before each decision. At each decision the controller asks two distinct questions: what local downside a deviation from the frozen anchor would induce under matched legal continuations, and what future adaptation value would be lost by consuming part of the remaining deviation budget now. The first question is answered by a monotone strategic-risk model over deviation intensity; the second by a paired budget-state continuation model that prices current budget consumption. The controller selects among support-preserving candidate deviations by trading immediate adaptation value against
对手行为变化时，预算适应机制下的风险校准。
- 核心方法
- 提出了一种双重反事实序列控制问题模型，利用决策前的可用信息评估偏差风险和未来适应价值损失。
- 适合谁读
- 研究者
- 要解决的问题
- 解决在对手行为发生偏移时，适应预算内的决策调整可能导致的风险问题。
- 关键实验
- 未提供
- 主要贡献
- 引入了单调战略风险模型和配对预算状态延续模型，为预算内适应策略提供系统性评估方法。
- 意义与局限
- 为动态对抗环境中预算有限的决策提供了新工具，但可能受限于实际对手行为变异性。