This is pure nightmare fuel. Identity theft of the past would be nothing compared to what vibe agents can do. Sending credentials is too obvious and for rookies. They could easily spread contaminations across ~/.claude, **/skills/*, or even just a PDF your agent visits periodically in /morning-brief. Your entire filesystem is the new distributed codebase. Every file that could go into context would add to the attack vector. Every text can be a base64 virus. In the new world of on-demand software, I try to minimize dependencies - people rarely need all the APIs supported in LiteLLM, might as well build a custom router with only what you need on the fly (which I did in one of my late-night claude sessions). Unfortunately, there is very little middleground between "pressing yes mindlessly for every edit" and "--dangerously-skip-permissions". There will be a full blooming industry for "de-vibing": dampening the slop and putting guardrails/accountability around agentic frameworks. They are the boring old, audited Software 1.0 that watches over the rebellious adolescents of Software 3.0. Claws need shells. Probably many layers of nested shells.· 未来身份盗窃的新噩梦

<p>This is pure nightmare fuel. Identity theft of the past would be nothing compared to what vibe agents can do. Sending credentials is too obvious and for rookies. They could easily spread contaminations across ~/.claude, **/skills/*, or even just a PDF your agent visits periodically in /morning-brief. Your entire filesystem is the new distributed codebase. Every file that could go into context w